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R O B E R T A. P R E S T O N 
Values in the College Curriculum' 
One indication that a word has either lost or changed its 
meaning is Us overuse. Because words are symbolic of ideas, the 
overuse of certain words points generally to an increasing vagueness 
of the meaning of ideas, a loss of the necessary precision for the 
adequate communication of ideas. This has occurred in regard to 
such words as "love," "freedom," "rights," and. "values"
 ;among 
others. There is no shortage in the use of these terms, but there does 
seem to be a correlation between the extent of their use and the loss of 
significant meaning. This is unfortunate because these terms refer to 
basic ideas and, if a society is uncertain or in basic disagreement 
concerning the meaning of fundamental concepts, this is a good 
indication of a a rather serious disarray. Since intellectual anarchy 
precedes political anarchy, there is reason for those' who are 
responsible for the education of the community to be concerned. If 
we cannot curb the confusion about ideas, we had best prepare for 
chaos within the political order. 
Since my topic concerns values within the college curriculum, I 
will begin with an explanation of how I shall employ the term. 
Because value is a basic concept, its meaning is at once simple.to 
understand but difficult to put into words. I will use the term "value" 
to refer to a quality that belongs to a thing either by reason of it being 
desired, or by which it is in and of itself desirable.-John Dewey 
distinguished between what a person valued and the,,process
 fof 
evaluation. What he was pointing out is that there is a distinction 
between what a person does in fact desire and what is good for him or 
her. Evaluation to Dewey meant the process by which we reflect on 
our values to determine if they will stand up to scrutiny. Are^we in 
pursuit of the values that will bring us happiness in the long run, or 
have we been misled by appearances? 
What needs to be resolved is the prior question as to whether 
today we are placing value on apparent "goods" when we should be 
*This essay is based on a talk delivered at Sacred Heart University on 
February 10, 1987 as an Honors Lecture. \ 
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seeking that which is inherently valuable. This raises the knotty issue 
as to whether there are things in and of themselves good regardless of 
whether or not they are valued. For example, in a society in which 
honesty was not sought for its own sake, one wherein an honest 
person'would in fact be handicapped by his or her honesty, would 
this mean that honesty was no longer a value? Or would it mean that 
such a society had lost sight of true values and was in serious trouble? 
The ^relativist must answer tha t value is de te rmined 
by what we do pursue; the realist must answer that there are values 
inherent in the nature of things and if we do not pursue these values, 
this is an unfortunate situation which will have a destructive result. 
The question we must now raise concerns whether or not there 
are any values that must be sought by a society that wishes to be free. 
The answer to this is that there have been those who have at least 
thought so. One of the earliest and most notable was Socrates, who 
was concerned with the question of moral virtue and who found 
himself at odds with the relativists of his day, namely, the Sophists. 
Among the earlier Sophists, one of the most famous was Protagoras, 
who proclaimed that "man is the measure of all things." The 
inference here is that truth is relative and laws are merely conventional, 
i.e., a just law is what the majority agrees is just. The later Sophists 
carried the implication of Protagoras' position to its logical 
conclusion. Thrasymachus, who appears in the first book of Plato's 
Republic, is cited as holding the position that right and wrong are 
determined by the self-interest of the ruling class. Socrates opposed 
the position of the relativist on the grounds that it would result in the 
destruction of the state. He held that there is a discoverable basis for 
truth and justice, and it is values objectively grounded that must be 
the foundation of society.^Socrates, although he lost the argument, 
was at least proved correct by the collapse of the Athenian society, 
one cause of which was internal moral decay. It is instructive for our 
purposes to listen to Thucydides, the Greek historian, who mentions 
a connection between the meaning of words and the downfall of 
Greek civilization: 
Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to 
take that which was'now given them. Reckless 
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audacity came to be considered the courage of a 
loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; 
moderation was held to be a cloak for un-
manliness . . .' 
Concerning respect for truth or the giving of one's word, Thucydides 
writes: 
Oaths of reconciliation, being only proffered on 
either side to meet an immediate difficulty, only 
held good so long as no other weapon was at hand; 
but when opportunity offered, he who first ventured 
to seize it and to take his enemy off his guard, 
thought this perfidious vengeance sweeter than an 
open one, since, considerations of safety apart, 
success by treachery won him the palm of superior 
intelligence.2 
Historically, then, we find philosophical relativism serving as 
corrosive agent on the social bonds that keep a political community 
intact, and, since the Sophists were among the earliest members of 
the brotherhood of teachers, we can say that teachers played an 
important role in the demise of the first democratic society. 
Albert W. Levi, an historian of ideas, in his work Philosophy 
and the Modern World, argues that there have been two great 
cultural epochs in which the political state was a force for 
humanization. One was Periclean Athens and the other was Medieval 
Europe between the 10th and the 14th centuries. The dissolution of 
the latter is usually ascribed to the rise of nominalism in the 14th 
century. Basically, nominalism is the position that there is no 
foundation in reality for the meaning of universal ideas; such terms 
as "human nature" or "good" or "truth" are collective names which 
refer to individual things or characteristics. This says, in effect, that 
reality is unintelligible. Levi concludes his analysis of the historical 
background of contemporary society in these words: 
3
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All of Western culture is haunted by the recollection 
of a previous golden age, an age in which there was 
a common language and a community of faith. The 
last golden age for Western man was the period of 
the medieval synthesis, with a stratified but secure 
organization of society, the monopoly of world 
interpretation by a single intellectual elite, and 
consequently a unified picture of human life and of 
the human person. But with the breakdown of 
medieval society under the impact of science and 
the commercial point of view, a rigidly organized 
and essentially closed society becomes a loosely 
integrated and an open society. Corresponding to 
the new social pluralism, the one elite is displaced 
by a plurality of warring elites with a plurality of 
intellectual points of view. The inescapable fact 
about the intellectual life of the modern world is the 
fact of multiplicity and division.3 
The British historian Christopher Dawson looks back over the 
same period and arrives at conclusions similar to Levi's. He points 
out the irony in the fact that the crisis that we now face is an 
intellectual one and that it is a failure that has occurred in the first 
society to achieve universal education.4 
Walter Lippmann in 1938 began work on a book because he felt 
"impelled by the need to make more intelligible to myself the 
alarming failure of the Western Liberal Democracies to cope with the 
realities of this century."5 His studies led him to the conclusion that 
there is a body of objectively grounded principles and precepts which 
a good citizen cannot deny or ignore.6 He cites with approbation 
Ernest Barker's position that for the past 200 years European 
thought has accepted the premise that the human mind can discover 
a basis for law and order which produces universal validity. This 
guided the thought of the Stoics, was accepted by the Roman 
lawyers, adopted by the Christian fathers, was re-established and 
reworked by Thomas Aquinas, and, in a new formulation, provided 
the philosophy for the American Revolution of 1776. According to 
4
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Lippmann the American experiment was founded on the basis "that 
a large plural society cannot be governed without recognizing that 
transcending its plural interests, there is a rational order with a 
superior common law." The current dilemma is a result of abandoning 
this position. Once again the relativists have replaced the realists. In 
Lippmann's words: 
In the prevailing popular culture all philosophies 
are the instruments of some man's purpose, all 
truths are self-centered and self-regarding, and all 
principles are the rationalizations of some special 
interests. There is no public criterion of the true and 
the false, of the right and the wrong, beyond that 
which the preponderant mass of voters, consumers, 
readers, and listeners happen at the moment to be 
supposed to want.8 
Lippmann sees the failure of the tradition of civility to hold its 
own against the onslaught of philosophical relativism to be a failure 
of educational institutions. We have not passed on the values that 
must be held in order to make democracy work. Lippmann 
concludes his study of the plight of our times in these words: 
I do not contend, though I hope, that the decline of 
Western society will be arrested if the teachers in 
our schools and universities come back to the great 
tradition of the public philosophy. But I do contend 
that the decline, which is already far advanced, 
cannot be arrested if the prevailing philosophers 
oppose this restoration and revival, if they impugn 
rather than support the validity of an order which is 
superior to the values that [Jean-Paul] Sartre tells 
each man 'to invent.* 
In this bird's eye view of history I have tried to establish the 
following points: 
5
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1. Free,societies have traditionally been established 
on the premise that there are objectively knowable 
„ principles of truth and falsity, of right and wrong. 
2. Such societies have endured just so'long as the 
educational system was able to successfully pass on 
this tradition. 
3. One cause of the downfall of any free society can 
be traced to the dissemination of the idea that truth 
is relative and that -law is the expression of the 
self-interest of those in power. 
4. The continuation or the downfall of any society is 
decided ultimately^in the classroom. 
Now if this reading of history is somewhat accurate and adequate to 
our purposes, it would follow that if we are not passing on in our 
schools the tradition that Lippmann calls the Public Philiosophy we 
shoud be heading for political trouble. 
Before determining whether or not we are passing on this value 
system, let us show that the United States was originally founded on 
it. In the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson and his co-signers 
set down as the guiding principle of the new political experiment a 
certain set of self-evident truths, viz., that all persons are equal before 
the law, that they receive their rights not from the state but from the 
Creator, and their basic rights include those of life and liberty and the 
pursuit of one's personal well-being. These ideas are basic to what is 
called^natural law theory and can be traced back from Jefferson to 
Locke to Hooker to Aquinas to Origen and to Aristotle and Plato.10 
Here again we have a reassertion of the basic position that in a free 
society political life must be directed by universally valid laws which 
are accessible'to the reason of man.11 
Are we passing on this tradition in a formal and systematic way? 
I know of no one who claims that we are. One academician who says 
that we are not fulfilling our educational duties to our society at the 
undergraduate level is William J. Bouwsman, Professor of History at 
Harvard University and from 1967-69 Vice Chancellor for Academic 
6
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Affairs at Berkeley. Bouwsman distinguishes between learning and 
education and presents the traditional view in Western society of 
education to be "the transmission of the deepest insights, attitudes 
and values of a society, the most precious legacy it can pass on to 
succeeding generations."12 We are not doing this. Why aren't we? 
Bouwsman's answer is the professionalization of the faculty, or what 
Jencks and Riesman called "the Academic Revolution." Bouwsman 
writes: 
For what the academic revolution has meant is, in 
effect, the triumph of learning over education, the 
laissez-faire pursuit of the specialized interests of 
learned men over the general formation "of the 
young. Absorbed in the search for truth, we have 
given a minimum of attention to the coherence of 
the entire intellectual enterprise of the university, to 
problems of meaning and value, and to our deeper 
social role. Seeing knowledge as an end in itself, we 
have lost sight of the broader purpose; and professors 
have tended increasingly to operate on the as-
sumption that education consisted essentially in the 
scholar's training his successors. In this light the 
university may well appear as the last stronghold of 
nineteenth-century liberalism, and in this respect 
not the most advanced but the most inert of 
institutions. It has operated on the vague assumption 
that if each scholar does his thing, all will somehow 
work out mysteriously for the best; through random 
exposure students will somehow emerge as educated 
men, and society should be content. This assumption 
has turned out to be dreadfully wrong.13 
I have pointed to a rather serious situation which affects the 
continuation of our free society. If I am right, then our failure to pass 
on to our youth for a period of several decades the basic truths, which 
have traditionally stood as the foundation of the Western liberal 
democracies, should have serious consequences. We should find in, 
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our society a general lack of trust between the citizens and their 
political leaders because once people lose the conviction that law is 
objective in its foundation and universal in its application they view it 
as representing the self-interest of those in power. Accompanying 
this should be a pervasive cynicism among the young who cannot 
find any reason to accept the voice of authority which to them speaks 
from a past which has no relevance in a world where all truth is 
relative. 
As one who holds the philosophical .position that Lippmann 
calls the Public Philosophy or to which I have referred as natural law 
theory, I should, about this point, recommend to you a return to this 
position and make a plea for all institutions of higher education to 
rededicate themselves to the basic principles of a free society and to 
make room in the college curriculum for the formal study and 
analysis of these principles. However, for me to advocate this would 
be to advocate a violation of the doctrine of academic freedom as it is 
presently interpreted by the American Association of University 
Professors. 
Let me briefly review this position: it is that an institution of 
higher education exists for the common good and not for the 
furtherance of the good of the individual faculty member or of the 
institution as a whole. That common good involves the free search 
for truth and its expression by highly trained professionals who are 
dedicated to the search for truth. In the words of Sanford H. Kadish, 
past president of the AAUP: 
. . . it further follows that the university and the 
faculty as a collectivity are debarred from identifying 
with particular causes or particular views of what is 
true or of what is right — beyond the procedural 
commitment to freedom — lest an orthodoxy be 
imposed of greater or lesser extent which subverts 
the special university role.14 
It follows from this that institutions of higher education must remain 
neutral on all matters of truth or falsity and of right and wrong. The 
8
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individual professor, however, is free to teach whatever position that 
his study and research have led him or her to. 
This sounds very plausible and in light of all of the instances one 
might cite from history of the subversion of truths by both political 
and ecclesiastical institutions, it would seem not only justified but 
wise. In the case of the natural sciences, there is little danger of any 
researcher or group of researchers promulgating error because the 
methodology of science is both a public method and self-correcting. 
Although the methodologies of the behavioral and social sciences are 
not as rigid and as accurate as the natural sciences, there are still 
guidelines that must be followed. 
In the field of philosophy, however, where one is not dealing 
with quanitifiable data or historically ascertainable facts, the problems 
are much different. How is one to distinguish between sound 
philosophical truths that command assent from all reasonable men 
and the latest errant nonsense that boggles the human mind? There is 
no clearly identifiable criteria of mathematical exactitude or statistical 
probability that one can appeal to in philosophy. Nor are there 
canons of credibility to which the philosopher can make an appeal as 
does the historian. Not even the laws of logic will uncover philo-
sophical error because logical consistency with false premises simply 
makes one logically correct but wrong nonetheless. 
My point is that the AAUP's position of demanding carte 
blanche for the professor to teach the findings of his or her research 
will not have any seriously adverse effect on truth in the natural, 
behavioral, or the social sciences. But the situation is quite different 
in the field of philosophy. First of all there is no one method to which 
all researchers must subject their findings, and secondly, philosophy 
deals with matters of ultimate concern and, as I have tried to show, a 
free political society can endure only so long as there is basic 
agreement on these matters of ultimate concern. 
It should be noted that the principles of a free society to which I 
have alluded are based upon, that is, logically entail, a definite 
metaphysics. If an academic institution were permitted to espouse 
these political principles it would, at least logically, be giving 
credence to the metaphysics upon which the principles are based. 
Therefore, to avoid this, the current doctrine of academic freedom 
9
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requires neutrality on the part of the institution in order to avoid the 
imposition of any orthodoxy at all. 
This then firmly fixes us on the horns of the dilemma. No free 
society can endure unless it can pass on to its youth the basic 
principles concerning the equality of men, the source of rights, and 
the basis of law. The current position of the AAUP forbids any 
institution of higher learning from requiring that these basic political 
doctrines be taught on the grounds that such would be a violation of 
academic freedom. 
When I sat down to prepare this talk I fully intended to spell out 
for you the values that I am convinced should be taught in our 
colleges, present a philosophic defense of these values, and finally 
encourage you to work towards including them in the curriculum. As 
you have just heard, my reflections led me elsewhere. I do not like 
where they led me. Perhaps you can find flaws in my argument. I will 
be most grateful if you can, because it would be a case where I would 
be cheered up by finding out that I was simply wrong. 
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